I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided to rehear Phillips v. AWH Corp.
1 en banc to reconcile its intracircuit split, clarify the proper principles of claim construction in a patent infringement or invalidity lawsuit, and provide litigants with some level of predictability in the appeals process. 2 In anticipation of this decision, numerous commentators hypothesized, advocated, and opined about how the Federal Circuit would or should settle the law of claim construction. 3 Although few agreed on a particular solution, nearly everyone agreed that one was needed to alleviate the instability and uncertainty plaguing the federal appellate process for claim construction appeals, and most were optimistic that the Federal Circuit's decision in Phillips would provide the answer. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit's Phillips opinion failed to reconcile its intracircuit split, and in a disillusioning analysis, the en banc court blurred the lines between two competing claim construction authorities without providing any firm guidance to the district courts on how a judge should approach claim construction. The law of claim construction prior to Phillips failed to provide the desired uniformity and predictability mandated by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1996 in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II). 5 In Phillips, however, the Federal Circuit saw no need to revise its previous claim construction decisions and merely restated a variation of the same principles it believed it had been applying all along. 6 Moreover, the Federal Circuit ultimately applied the same basic principles of claim construction to the Phillips patent as the now-vacated panel and district court decisions below, yet reached a different conclusion as to the definition of the disputed term and accordingly reversed the lower court's judgment of noninfringement.
Despite the Federal Circuit's intentions in Phillips, the law of claim construction remains just as ambiguous, uncertain, and subject to reversal as before. The Phillips opinion exemplifies the inherent flaws in the law of claim construction created by the Federal Circuit's numerous en banc and panel opinions since its landmark decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman I).
7
In addition, the Federal guidance as to when it is appropriate to look to the specification to narrow the claim by interpretation and when it is not appropriate to do so. Until we provide better guidance, I fear that the lower courts and litigants will remain confused. 5. 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) . According to the Supreme Court in Markman II, this desired uniformity and predictability was precisely the reason it decided that claim construction was by reviewing the district court's claim construction rulings entirely de novo, only increases the ambiguity of the appeals process in a patent infringement or invalidity lawsuit. The problem with a de novo standard of review, in the context of claim construction, is that even if a district court applies the correct claim construction principles, the Federal Circuit remains free to analyze the claims anew without any deference to the lower court's findings. This practice may result in the term ultimately being defined more accurately. However, it also created enormous unpredictability for litigants because the Federal Circuit is not bound to merely accept or reject the lower court's claim construction, but can generate an entirely new definition for the disputed term. 9 Overruling Cybor, and redesignating claim construction as an issue of fact or at least subject to some degree of deference, has been the most popular solution offered to ease this unpredictability. 10 In fact, this is the position taken by AWH Corporation in its petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court after its judgment of noninfringement was reversed by the Federal Circuit in Phillips.
11
However, even under a deferential standard of review, actually determining whether the district court's claim construction is "clearly erroneous" will remain equally unpredictable until the Federal Circuit provides clearer guidelines on claim construction to the lower courts.
The least drastic and most practical way to provide uniformity and predictability to claim construction without sacrificing accuracy is for the Federal Circuit to set forth a distinct rubric of rules, including a specific sequence of analysis and consideration of evidence, and then apply these 8. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 9. Theoretically, if one applies the correct legal standard, one reaches the correct result and accurately defines the term. Arguably, however, one could apply the correct legal standard, but still incorrectly construe the disputed term. Reviewing appeals for clear error and remanding inaccurate claims constructions should sufficiently correct these mistakes, making an entirely de novo review excessive.
10 rules consistently in its own opinions. The Federal Circuit must limit the flexibility of district court judges and of itself in construing claimsregardless of whether it decides to revisit Cybor. Further, those Federal Circuit judges who disagree with the current standard of review and fact/law distinction-and who can typically be counted on to dissentmust also agree to follow precedent in their respective panel decisions, and address their differences on these issues separately from the task of construing disputed claim terms. 12 Otherwise, litigants and their attorneys can never hope to have the predictability and certainty the Supreme Court sought to provide in Markman II. 13 
II. BACKGROUND

A. General Principles of Patent Law
14
The United States Constitution vests in Congress the authority " [t] o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 15 The constitutional purpose for granting patents is to encourage innovation by protecting the rights of inventors while ultimately increasing the public storehouse of knowledge. 16 A patent grants the patentee the exclusive "right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, [selling], . . . or importing" a patented invention in the United States during the patent term. 17 In exchange for this limited monopoly, inventors are required to provide a full disclosure of the invention:
12. Circuit Judges Newman and Mayer have strongly and consistently opposed de novo review, and the classification of claim construction as purely a matter of law, since Markman I. E.g., Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578, 1586 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Mayer, J., concurring) (noting that the court of appeals should give deference to the trial court's factual findings in claim interpretation where material facts are disputed).
13. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's mandate of uniformity and predictability).
14. For further background reading on patent law, see DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 72-115 (3d ed. 2004).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress has prescribed specific rules and guidelines regarding the requirements for obtaining a U.S. patent. 35 U.S.C. § § 100-250 (2000) . Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations also prescribes rules for patent drafting and prosecution. 37 C.F.R. § § 1.01-.997 (2005 17. 35 U.S.C. § 154. The patent term is twenty years from the filing date of the utility application or from the filing date of an earlier-filed utility application to which the patent at issue claims priority. Id. § 154(a)(2).
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The [patent] specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art 18 . . . to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. The [patent] shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
19
The claims of a patent describe the metes and bounds of a patentee's right to exclude others from making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing a patented invention within the United States. 20 In general, the patent claims broadly define the claimed invention, whereas the patent specification sets forth the invention in more exacting terms.
21 This is because the specification must include a detailed description and set forth the "best mode" of the invention, whereas the patent claims often employ broad, open-ended language and "may vary in scope or method of description or expression" as long as they are supported by the specification. 22 However, the scope of a patentee's rights are defined by the scope of the broadest claims and not by the scope of the specification. Thus, patent drafters generally write claims in a reverse pyramid fashion with the first claim being in independent form (i.e., self-contained) and broadest in scope and subsequent claims depending from this claim and becoming increasingly narrower in scope. These subsequent dependent claims refer back to and incorporate by reference the subject matter of the independent claim, while adding further limitations to the scope of that independent claim. 23 From the broadest to the most particularized 18 . See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (stating that to be patentable an invention must not be "obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains"). "Person skilled in the art" is a legal fiction, similar to the "reasonable man" concept. It is used in patent law to refer to a hypothetical person considered to have average expertise and knowledge with regard to the technical field of a particular invention (also referred to as "persons of ordinary skill in the art"). CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 536 n.25 (citing Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the "Invention" Requirement, in NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 1:508 (John Witherspoon ed., 1980)).
19. § 112 (footnote added). Patentable subject matter must also be novel, id. § 102, and nonobvious, id. § 103.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) . A common misconception about patents is that they grant the patent holder the right to make, use, or sell the patented invention; when in fact, all a patent confers is the right to prevent others from doing so. It is, in essence, a negative right. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 90.
21. See § 112 (explaining the requirements for specifications and claims). 22. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 91. 23. § 112 ("A claim may be written in independent or, if the nature of the case admits, in dependent or multiple dependent form. Subject to the following paragraph, a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of and narrow versions of the invention, this practice allows patentees to claim their invention in varying capacities and alternative forms in an attempt to expand their patent rights as far as legitimately possible. 24 The doctrine of claim differentiation gives rise to the presumption during claim construction that a patentee did not intend for broader independent claims to contain the limitations added by subsequent dependent claims.
25
The doctrine thus precludes a court from reading those limitations into the independent claims, because doing so would unduly limit the scope of those claims and, consequently, the scope of the patentee's invention and rights. 26 In addition to defining the scope of a patentee's rights, patent claims also serve to provide public notice of the scope of these rights and of the invention in general. 27 However, patents are not directed toward the general public, but toward persons of ordinary skill in the relevant technical field of the invention. 28 Accordingly, the claims must be construed from the perspective of those persons of ordinary skill in the art and not from the perspective of the public generally. For example, when a court reads a patent, "[a] technical term used in [the patent] is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons experienced in the field of the invention." 29 Competing inventors are entitled to rely on claim language to anticipate whether a given conception or creation will infringe the patented invention and to determine the necessary steps to design around the patented invention and avoid infringement. 30 the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers."). See infra text accompanying notes 109-10 for an example of an independent and dependent claim set.
24. Under existing law, patentees sometimes play the odds and write intentionally ambiguous claims, which increases their scope to capture other embodiments that the patentee did not envision at the time of filing 25. 5A DONALD S. 
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B. Claim Construction Principles
Claim Construction Analysis
When a patentee believes that another's device infringes the patented invention, the patentee can sue the alleged infringer in federal district court. Regardless of the district where the patentee files the case, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit generally hears all patent infringement appeals. 31 Unless the Federal Circuit chooses to hear a case en banc, it hears all appeals in three-judge panels. A patent infringement analysis is a two-step process: (1) determining the meaning of the claim terms through a process known as claim construction; and (2) comparing the allegedly infringing device, method, or composition of matter to the properly construed claims to determine whether there is literal infringement or infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 32 The "claim construction inquiry . . . begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claims." 33 Thus, the language of the claims determines the scope of a patentee's right to exclude others from infringing his patented invention. In Markman I, the Federal Circuit held that claim construction was a matter of law purely within the province of the courts. 36 The Supreme Court affirmed, in a unanimous opinion, holding that although claim construction included a number of factual underpinnings the judge would need to consider, a patent is a legal instrument which, for policy reasons, should be construed by the judge and not the jury. 37 According to the Court,
[p]atent construction in particular "is a special occupation, requiring, like all others, special training and practice. The judge, from his training and discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation to such instruments than a jury . . . ." [A] ny credibility determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document . . . .
38
The Court hoped this would create increased uniformity and predictability and strengthen the patent system. 
42
The Supreme Court, in Markman II, did not explicitly address the issue of standard of review. 43 However, in Cybor the Federal Circuit decided that it would review a district court's claim construction decisions de novo on appeal, "including any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim construction."
44 Cybor explicitly overruled a line of Federal Circuit cases that had recognized the claim construction inquiry as a quasi-factual undertaking or as a mixed question of law and fact. 45 This line of cases held that the district court judge was best positioned to make any findings of fact or credibility determinations regarding claim construction and, accordingly, deferred to such findings or determinations in conducting claim construction analysis on appeal.
46
After Cybor, the Federal Circuit began conducting its own independent claim construction inquiries on appeal, regardless of whether the district court applied the correct claim construction standard. Cybor marked the beginning of an ever increasing reversal rate of claim construction related appeals, which is currently at about thirty percent. 47 The Federal Circuit's en banc decision in Phillips exemplifies the perils of de novo review and underscores the argument that without clearer claim 41 47. Moore, supra note 41, at 239. One reason for this high reversal rate could be that the Federal Circuit is more "pro patent" than the lower courts. In seventy-six percent of the cases studied, the alleged infringer won at the district court level, whereas the Federal Circuit favored the alleged infringer only fifty-eight percent of the time. Id. at 240-41. However, closer inspection reveals that the Federal Circuit is just as likely to reverse a case won by the patentee as it is to reverse a case won by the alleged infringer. Id. at 241. Patent law does have safeguards in place to avoid this waste of judicial economy. A party can request certification of an interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit on the district judge's claim construction before proceeding with the rest of the trial. However, the Federal Circuit has yet to grant such a request. The Federal Circuit in Vitronics clearly enumerated the procedure to be followed in conducting claim construction analysis and set forth a clear order for considering evidence. According to the Vitronics panel, the claim construction analysis begins with the words of the claims, which "are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning." 60 Second, a court should consult the specification to see if the patentee explicitly defined the disputed term therein or if the patentee used the term in a way that is inconsistent with the ordinary and customary meaning. 61 A patentee may define a term to mean something other than its ordinary and customary definition as long as this special definition is clearly set forth in the specification or prosecution history.
62 Third, a court should look to the prosecution history to see if the patentee explicitly defined or disclaimed a given definition for the disputed term or used the term in a particular context that sheds light on the intended meaning. 63 According to the court, patentees often limit the definition and scope of a term in order to overcome prior art, 64 and courts should use such disclaimers to limit the definition of the disputed term 56 63. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582-83. Of course, a patentee may also inadvertently limit the definition of the term by using it restrictively in the prosecution history. Id. at 1583.
64. "Prior art" is a term used in patent law to designate all publicly disclosed information relevant to the patent application in question. Sources of prior art include prior publications and academic articles, prior patents or published applications, and prior general knowledge. Patents commonly serve as prior art for other patent applications. In order to obtain a patent, a patentee must overcome this prior art to satisfy the novelty requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 102. The invention must be novel over what has been patented or otherwise disclosed before. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (8th ed. 2004). KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 accordingly in claim construction. 65 Courts should also look to the prior art cited in the prosecution history for any use of the disputed term. 66 Ultimately, a patentee should generally be held to any intended or implied definition expressed in the prosecution history.
67
The patent specification, claims, and prosecution history constitute the intrinsic evidence, which, according to the Federal Circuit in Vitronics, is the "most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language." 68 According to the Vitronics panel, when the specification appears clear, unambiguous, and enables the court to determine the meaning of the disputed term intended by the patentee, reliance on extrinsic evidence is improper. 69 The intrinsic record is also the only information specifically relating to the patent that becomes part of the public record and on which competitors are entitled to rely to determine the scope of the patent.
70
In contrast, extrinsic evidence is not part of the public record, and the public notice function of patents is ill-served when courts rely on this information in construing claims. For this reason, the Vitronics panel cautioned that courts should consult extrinsic evidence only as a last resort and should never use the extrinsic evidence to alter the meaning of the disputed term reflected in the public record. 71 Based upon these principles, the three-judge panel 72 held that the intrinsic evidence in Vitronics was clear and unambiguous, and therefore, it was improper for the district court judge to have afforded the extrinsic evidence any weight.
73
After Vitronics, courts applying this standard have relied heavily on the intrinsic evidence when construing claims, often to the complete exclusion of extrinsic evidence. According to the Federal Circuit in Texas Digital, a court should approach claim construction with the heavy presumption that disputed claim terms carry their ordinary and customary meaning as understood from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art. 75 Judges are generally not persons of ordinary skill in the relevant technical field of the patent or related fields.
76 Therefore, the Texas Digital panel reasoned "that dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particularly useful resources to assist the court in determining the ordinary and customary meanings of claim terms." 77 The three-judge panel 78 cited Vitronics for the proposition that a court may consult a dictionary at any time during the proceeding to determine the meaning of a disputed term as long as that meaning does not conflict with the patent documents. 79 Indeed, in a footnote, the Vitronics court had stated that dictionaries, although part of the extrinsic evidence, were "worthy of special note." 80 However, contrary to Vitronics, the Texas Digital panel cautioned against consulting the intrinsic evidence first and instead recommended that a court consult the dictionary as a threshold step in the process of claim construction.
81
According to the Texas Digital panel, consulting the intrinsic evidence first, before attempting to determine the plain meaning of the disputed terms, could inadvertently lead to importing limitations from the patent specification into the claims and unduly limiting their scope-a basic prohibition in patent law.
82
Under Texas Digital, once a court determines the plain meaning of the disputed term, it should then consult the intrinsic evidence to: (1) 75 The Texas Digital panel further opined that courts should not label dictionaries as part of the extrinsic evidence because they are publicly available to aid in interpretation at the time the patent issues, are therefore part of the public record, and thus do not undermine the public notice function of patents.
84 Accordingly, the panel reasoned, a judge should be able to consult a dictionary, encyclopedia, or technical treatise at any time while conducting a claim construction inquiry, regardless of whether the parties have offered such resources into evidence. 85 Further, the panel observed that, unlike other resources, dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises "are unbiased reflections of common understanding not influenced by expert testimony or events subsequent to the fixing of the intrinsic record by the grant of the patent, not colored by the motives of the parties, and not inspired by litigation." 86 Courts, applying this standard, including other Federal Circuit panels, adopted what has been coined the "dictionary first" approach and relied heavily on dictionaries, encyclopedias, and similar sources to define disputed claim terms. In theory, if the Federal Circuit was providing adequate guidance, claim construction at the district court level should have improved significantly in the ten years since Markman II, and the rate of reversal on appeal should be decreasing. However, this is not the case. Since Markman II and Cybor, the Federal Circuit can agree neither on the standard to be applied nor on the standard it believes it has been applying all along. 93 It has failed to provide adequate claim construction guidance to lower courts, and more importantly, it has failed to meet the mandate of uniformity and predictability set forth by the Supreme Court in Markman II. 94 The problem lies partly in the fact that the Federal Circuit judges seem to disagree amongst themselves on the appropriate claim 88 Edward Phillips invented interchangeable steel modular panels that can be easily welded together to create extra detention areas for jails or other similar facilities when the main facility overflows with occupants. 95 These modules consist of inner and outer steel walls and provide the needed load bearing and structural support to withstand jailbreak efforts, vandalism, riot, fire, impact, explosion, or gunfire.
96
"Internally directed" steel baffles are positioned between the inner and outer walls to increase the module's strength and provide the requisite impact resistance (i.e., bullet-deflecting capabilities). 97 On July 7, 1987, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) granted Phillips a patent for his invention, which is embodied in U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798.
98
The alleged infringer, AWH Corporation, had previously marketed and sold the patented invention under an express agreement between AWH and Phillips. 99 After the agreement ended, Phillips alleged that AWH continued to use the patented invention without his consent. 100 Infringement in this case ultimately centered on the meaning of the term "baffle" in the patent claims and, in particular, the angle of orientation of the baffles relative to the steel walls as required by the patent. 101 For example, if the patent claim required the baffles to be disposed at angles other than ninety degrees, then AWH's modules did not infringe the 95 However, if the baffles could be disposed at all angles including ninety degrees, then AWH's modules were infringing Phillips's patent. 103 The description of the invention in the patent does not contain any references to baffles disposed at ninety-degree angles, and all references to baffle angles refer to either acute or obtuse angles. 104 In particular, the patent describes baffles that are specifically disposed at angles necessary to deflect bullets. 105 As a matter of physics, only baffles disposed at angles other than ninety degrees are capable of deflecting bullets, as bullets or other projectiles could easily go between baffles perpendicular to the wall face. 106 Therefore, on first impression, the specification seems to require baffles disposed at angles other than ninety degrees. However, there is no such limitation in the language of claim 1, the broadest claim, which requires only that the baffles extend inwardly from either wall. 107 In fact, claim 1 does not refer to baffle angles at all. 108 It reads:
Building modules adapted to fit together for construction of fire, sound and impact resistant security barriers and rooms for use in securing records and persons, comprising in combination, an outer shell of substantially parallelepiped shaped with two outer steel plate panel sections of greater surface area serving as inner and outer walls for a structure when a plurality of the modules are fitted together, sealant means spacing the two panel sections from steel to steel contact with each other by a thermal-acoustical barrier material, and further means disposed inside the shell for increasing its load bearing capacity comprising internal steel baffles extending inwardly from the steel shell walls. The district court judge had to determine whether the "baffles" disclosed in claim 1 could be disposed at ninety-degree angles or were required to be disposed only at acute or obtuse angles. 111 The parties originally stipulated that the term "baffle" meant a "means for obstructing, impeding or checking the flow of something." 112 The parties did not, however, stipulate or define the angle of orientation of the baffles. 113 The patentee invoked the doctrine of claim differentiation, 114 and argued that because subsequent dependent claims specified an angle of orientation for the disclosed baffles, but claim 1 did not, the doctrine precluded the judge from reading a specific angle requirement into claim 1. 115 The alleged infringer, AWH Corporation, argued that the language of claim 1 inadequately defined the term "baffle," and therefore the judge should construe the term in light of the narrower description in the specification.
116
The district court claim construction analysis began with the intrinsic evidence and, in particular, with the language of the claims construed in light of the specification and the diagrams. 117 Indeed, the judge cited Vitronics for the proposition that the intrinsic evidence is "the most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language."
118 The judge also looked at the Phillips patent prosecution history-which is also part of the intrinsic evidence.
119
In citing Vitronics the judge further explained that a court should limit its use of 
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extrinsic evidence to define a disputed term when the intrinsic record is unambiguous as to that term's meaning.
120
The court explained that although a judge should not use the specification to limit the scope of the claims, there are several exceptions to this general rule. 121 First, when a patentee describes only one embodiment of the invention and fails to designate it as the "best mode" or "preferred embodiment," a court can view that single embodiment as the only patented embodiment of the invention instead of simply the best version of the invention.
122 Second, when the specification specifically sets forth a special definition for a term and/or the intended meaning of a claim term is unclear in the context of the claims, the narrower scope and language of the specification controls construction of the term. 123 Third, when a patentee expresses a claim element in "means-plus-function" 124 format defining the function of the element but not its structure, a court looks to descriptions of that structure in the specification to define and limit the element in the claims.
125
After stating the relevant claim construction law, the judge turned to the Phillips patent claim language, written description, and diagrams. The judge first determined that the definition of the term "baffles" remained ambiguous in the context of the claims, despite the parties' stipulated definition. 126 Further, the judge determined that claim 1 was written as a "means-plus-function" description. 127 The judge also noted that "[a]ll of the diagrams display[ed] the internal baffles extending from an acute or oblique angle to the wall faces. No diagram show[ed] a baffle extending internally at a right angle to a face wall in a T-shaped form or connecting the two wall faces." 128 The judge concluded that because Phillips described and diagramed only baffles extending inwardly from the modular wall faces at angles other than ninety degrees, and did not designate these diagrams or descriptions as the "best mode," the scope of the claims was limited to baffles disposed at angles (2000) ("An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.").
125 other than ninety degrees as disclosed in the specification. 129 The judge reasoned that in light of the aforementioned exceptions, she appropriately limited the definition and scope of the term "baffle" in claim 1 to the usage of the term in the specification.
130
The judge also reasoned that the narrower definition was consistent with both the parties' stipulated definition and the prosecution history.
131
For example, in order for the baffles to check, impede, or obstruct the flow of anything that may impact the module walls (per the stipulated definition), the baffles cannot be perpendicular to the surface of these walls. 132 The judge also noted that the originally presented language of claim 1 did not contain any reference to baffles at all, but that Phillips later added this reference in response to, and in order to overcome, a prior art rejection from the patent examiner.
133 Upon inspection of the prior art, the judge determined that perpendicular baffles would lack novelty over the prior art and render the Phillips patent invalid. 134 Therefore, in accordance with the general principle that courts must attempt to construe patent claims so as to uphold their validity, the judge determined that Phillips's baffles were not disposed at perpendicular angles.
135
In light of the construed definition, the district court judge granted AWH Corporation's motion for summary judgment of noninfringement.
136 Phillips appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the district court improperly read limitations from the specification into the claims. Although the majority disagreed with the district court's determination that claim 1 included "means-plus-function" language, the panel ultimately concluded that the district court judge properly construed the meaning of the term "baffle."
139 Federal Circuit Judge Dyk dissented from the opinion.
140
The panel majority began its analysis of the Phillips patent with the language of the claims in light of the specification, prosecution history, and other intrinsic evidence.
141 It explained that the presumption in favor of the ordinary and customary meaning of a disputed term "baffle" is overcome "if the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention."
142 The majority then noted Phillips's numerous references in the patent to the impact and projectileresistant properties of the modular wall system. 143 After reading the specification, it determined that Phillips viewed impact resistance as an important or essential feature of the invention and that baffles disposed at ninety-degree angles would not have provided this feature.
144
The majority also agreed with the district court judge's determination that the baffles in the Phillips patent had to be orientated at angles other than ninety degrees in order to avoid the prior art. 145 For all of these reasons, it determined that the district court judge's claim construction did not erroneously import limitations from the specification into the claims, as argued by Phillips. 146 The Federal Circuit Judge Dyk, dissenting, argued that the majority improperly limited the scope of the claims to the preferred embodiment in the specification, and construed the disputed term "baffle" in a manner contrary to the plain meaning stipulated by the parties and supported by the dictionary. 148 He also did not think that the majority should have departed from the plain meaning of the term "baffle" because of prior art concerns. 149 In his view, the single embodiment disclosed in the patent was merely the preferred embodiment.
150 He rejected the notion that claims must be construed in light of this embodiment when it is the only embodiment disclosed.
151 He also did not view impact resistance as an essential feature of the invention, but merely one of a number of objectives achieved by the invention.
152 Judge Dyk disagreed with the majority's interpretation that the specification clearly limited the invention to baffles disposed at angles other than ninety degrees, because although the specification did not reference any baffles orientated at ninety degrees, it also did not disclaim baffles orientated at ninety degrees.
153 Accordingly, he concluded that the plain meaning of the term "baffle," and thus the dictionary definition, represented the correct construction of the term.
154
Phillips appealed to the Federal Circuit for an en banc rehearing of the case.
B. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Grants
En Banc Review of Phillips
The Federal Circuit Posed Seven Questions for Consideration En Banc
The Federal Circuit granted Phillips's petition to rehear the appeal en banc "in order to resolve issues concerning the construction of patent The court also invited the submission of amicus curiae briefs on any or all of these questions by any interested parties and specifically addressed an invitation to the USPTO to submit a brief. 159 Circuit Judge Rader concurred in the opinion and added an additional-and perhaps more poignant-question to be considered by the parties and amicus curiae briefs:
Is claim construction amenable to resolution by resort to strictly algorithmic rules, e.g., specification first, dictionaries first, etc.? Or is claim construction better achieved by using the order or tools relevant in each case to discern the meaning of terms according to the understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, thus entrusting trial courts to interpret claims as a contract or statute? 160 In posing these questions, the court indicated it planned not only to address the claim construction analyses at issue, but planned also to settle the broader issue of its intracircuit split arising out of the Vitronics and Texas Digital line of cases. In anticipation of the en banc rehearing patent commentators wrote numerous articles. In response to the seven questions posed to the parties and patent bar generally, the Federal Circuit received over thirtyfive amicus curiae briefs. Many of these called for the court to advocate a specific set of rules for conducting claim construction. [A]ny attempt to refine the process is futile. Nearly a decade of confusion has resulted from the fiction that claim construction is a matter of law, when it is obvious that it depends on underlying factual determinations which, like all factual questions if disputed, are the province of the trial court, reviewable on appeal for clear error. To pretend otherwise inspires cynicism. Therefore, and because I am convinced that shuffling our current precedent merely continues a charade, I dissent from the en banc order. Id. (Mayer, J., dissenting) 
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Some commentators argued that the "dictionary first" approach would eventually promote uniformity by formalizing the claim construction process. 163 They contended that by relying on dictionary definitions to construe claim terms, courts would eventually force inventors to formalize the language used in patent drafting, which, in turn, would lead to a more formalized and standardized system of patent claim drafting. 164 Further, this practice would encourage patent drafters to specify a preferred dictionary during prosecution or include a glossary of definitions in the patent itself. 165 However, other commentators pointed out the practical difficulties with the "dictionary first" method, particularly when dealing with existing (instead of future) patents. 166 For example, determining which dictionaries were publicly available at the time of issue or application of the patent and subsequently locating those dictionaries may be an impossible task in some cases.
167 Some commentators also argued that dictionaries and other extrinsic evidence are too subjective and do not focus the claim construction inquiry on the meaning of the claims in the context of the entire patent.
168
"[I]f a court does need to look to a dictionary or treatise to find the meaning of a word, it follows that the word for which they search has a meaning that is not 'ordinary' or 'customary' at all," 169 or at least not to the court. Accordingly, these commentators insisted, courts should limit the use of dictionaries to only those introduced into evidence by the parties during litigation and only at the district court stage. 170 The 
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"general purpose dictionaries may be helpful" to the court's understanding of how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand it. 177 However, the court recognized that in many cases that give rise to litigation, the meaning of a disputed term is often more obscure and each party legitimately believes its definition is the "correct" one. It stated that the meaning of a claim term as understood by persons of skill in the art is often not immediately apparent, and because patentees frequently use terms idiosyncratically, the court looks to "those sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to mean." 178 "Those sources" include both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. 179 The court then proceeded to analyze the relative importance of these various sources.
a. Intrinsic Evidence
The claim construction analysis began with the language of the disputed claim itself, the context and usage of the disputed term within that claim, and the other claims of the patent. 180 The court referred to the patent claims, both asserted and unasserted, as "valuable sources" providing "substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms."
181 According to the court, differences and similarities among the usage of the same, similar, or different claim terms can usually illuminate the meaning of the term in question. 182 Next, the court instructed that the claims must, however, be read in the context of the specification and cannot be construed in a vacuum. According to the court, "[t]he claims are directed to the invention that is described in the specification; they do not have meaning removed from the context from 177. Id. at 1314. The court later defines ordinary meaning differently during its discussion of the Texas Digital method. "Properly viewed, the 'ordinary meaning' of a claim term is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent." Id. at 1321. This second definition suggests that courts should not look to the dictionary to determine the plain meaning of a term, but perhaps hear expert testimony from persons of ordinary skill in the art as to their understanding of the patent. The Federal Circuit concluded its analysis of intrinsic evidence sources by fully endorsing heavy reliance on the specification in construing claim terms. 185 As an afterthought, the court added that a judge should also consult the prosecution history, when the parties have offered it into evidence, because it can provide objective insight into how the inventor and USPTO perceived the invention at the time of filing and how that perception changed during ongoing prosecution of the claims.
186
For example, the inventor may have specially defined or disclaimed a given meaning for a claim term in a correspondence with the USPTO. However, the court cautioned that the prosecution history is a less relevant intrinsic source, often lacking requisite clarity, because it represents an ongoing communication between the patentee and the patent examiner and not the final coherent product.
187 Therefore, it may not add significantly to the understanding of a judge when the meaning of the disputed term is already ambiguous.
188
Although its analysis began with the particular language of the claims, the Federal Circuit seemed to emphasize the probative value of the specification over all other sources. 189 General principles of patent law, however, support this position. The Code of Federal Regulations requires that "terms and phrases used in the claims must find clear support or antecedent basis in the [specification] so that the meaning of the terms in the claims may be ascertainable by reference to the [specification] ."
190 Thus, the regulations clearly contemplate that one reads the claims in the context of the specification, not divorced from it.
b. Extrinsic Evidence
Although courts are authorized to consider extrinsic evidence in construing a disputed term, the Federal Circuit finds this evidence "less significant than the intrinsic record in determining 'the legally operative 183 meaning of claim language. '" 191 According to the court, a judge may find dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises useful in claim construction. In particular, such sources help judges become familiar with the technical terminology and understand the underlying technology of a patented invention.
192 These sources also give judges insight into the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art.
193 Expert testimony can similarly provide a judge with useful background information, explain how an invention works, and help ensure that a judge's understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is consistent with the state of the relevant art.
194
The Federal Circuit, however, cautioned against relying too heavily on the extrinsic evidence when construing claim terms. Extrinsic evidence, the court explained, is not part of the public record, and unlike the specification, was not created specifically to describe the scope and meaning of the patented invention. Extrinsic evidence also may not accurately reflect the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art. 195 The court also pointed out that unlike intrinsic evidence, extrinsic evidence is "generated at the time of and for the purpose of litigation. . . . [E]ach party will naturally choose the pieces of extrinsic evidence most favorable to its cause, leaving the court the considerable task of filtering the useful extrinsic evidence from the fluff." 196 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that although both sources of evidence are admissible, as a matter of judicial discretion, extrinsic evidence is less reliable than intrinsic evidence for the purpose of construing patent claims. 197 However, according to the court many of these assumptions regarding extrinsic evidence do not necessarily apply to dictionaries and other similar reference sources, which is why the Federal Circuit next needed to explain what it meant in Texas Digital. The Federal Circuit, in addressing its intracircuit split, stated that the principles already outlined were the same general claim construction principles that the court had clearly articulated on "numerous occasions," but that a recent line of cases arising after Texas Digital placed greater emphasis on dictionary definitions and "assigned a less prominent role to the specification and the prosecution history" in construing disputed terms.
198
The court then attempted to clarify and explain its panel decision in Texas Digital. 199 The Federal Circuit agreed with the Texas Digital panel's concern regarding improperly importing limitations into the claims from the specification. 200 However, the court believed that the remedy chosen by the Texas Digital panel-the "dictionary first" approach-placed too much emphasis on the extrinsic evidence and inappropriately deemphasized the importance of the intrinsic evidence. 201 According to the court, consulting the dictionary as the threshold step (and only consulting the specification as a "check on the dictionary meaning of the term") "improperly restricts the role of the specification in claim construction . . . [and] focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the patent."
202
The Federal Circuit further explained that because dictionaries can contain expansive lists of definitions for a single term, consulting the dictionary before reading the patent would cause courts to define disputed terms too broadly. 203 In addition, even though under Texas Digital courts may narrow these broad definitions using the specification, if a court fails to "appreciate how the specification implicitly limits that definition, the error will systematically cause the construction of the claim to be unduly expansive." 204 To avoid this, the Federal Circuit advocated that claim construction analyses should begin with the intrinsic evidence "rather than starting with a broad definition and whittling it down." practical considerations that arise when using dictionaries to define terms. 206 For example, patents intrinsically relate to previously unknown subject matter, whereas dictionaries relate to existing information and known terms and, therefore, cannot be expected to account for new subject matter that may be disclosed in a patent.
207
Consulting dictionaries and other similar sources as the primary type of evidence is problematic because of discrepancies that can occur between the subject matter of the patent, which inherently must be novel, and the subject matter of the dictionary definitions, which inherently is not.
d. Texas Digital Unexplained
If the Federal Circuit had ended its analysis here, district courts, litigants, inventors, and patent attorneys would have had a relatively workable standard for drafting claims at the outset and conducting claim construction in the event of litigation. The analysis thus far, while stating nothing new, provided a reasonably clear hierarchy of evidence and a suggested order for consulting such evidence when interpreting claims. The Federal Circuit, however, seemed uncomfortable with these specific and moderately fixed rules and therefore began qualifying many of the previous statements it had made. In doing so, however, it only complicated matters and effectively ruined any sense of guidance provided by the initial analysis.
The Federal Circuit began by saying it "[did] not intend to preclude the appropriate use of dictionaries" 209 and that "[a] dictionary definition has the value of being an unbiased source 'accessible to the public in advance of litigation. '" 210 Further, "judges are free to consult dictionaries and technical treatises 'at any time in order to better to understand the underlying technology and may also rely on dictionary definitions when construing claim terms.'" 211 Contradicting its earlier 206. Id. The court stated: Dictionaries, by their nature, provide an expansive array of definitions. General dictionaries, in particular, strive to collect all uses of particular words, from the common to the obscure. By design, general dictionaries collect the definitions of a term as used not only in a particular art field, but in many different settings. criticism of the Texas Digital threshold step, the court stated that while reading a patent a judge may even consult this type of evidence "before reviewing the remainder of the patent to determine how the patentee has used the term." 212 Finally, the en banc court concluded (or conceded) that there is "no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction" and that case-by-case adjudication will ultimately be necessary because the particular facts of the patent will determine the most appropriate manner for construing the claims. 213 Moreover, the Federal Circuit expressly approved the Vitronics analysis, 214 which it believed to be consistent with this flexible approach to claim construction. 215 However, upon review of the Vitronics panel decision, it seems to set forth a distinct set of claim construction rules and a particular order of analysis which, in fact, do not appear consistent with the flexible approach adopted by the Federal Circuit in Phillips. The Federal Circuit began analyzing the patent with the usage of the disputed term in the claim itself. According to the court, claim 1 imposed only three requirements on the baffles: (1) the baffles must be made of steel; (2) they must have load-bearing capacity; and (3) they must extend inward from the surface of the walls. 217 The court found these requirements consistent with the parties' stipulated dictionary definition of the term as a "means for obstructing, impeding or checking the flow of something." 218 The court looked next to use of the term in the context of the other claims and concluded that the other claims "specify [more] particular functions to be served by the baffles."
219
Using the doctrine of claim differentiation, the court concluded that Phillips did not intend to impose these specific restrictions on the more contradict "'any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.'" Id. at 1323 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6).
212. Id. at 1324 (emphasis added); see also supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons for using intrinsic evidence first).
213. general functions of the baffles in claim 1. 220 The court then turned to the specification and concluded that it did not require all baffles in the invention to be disposed at angles other than ninety degrees. 221 The court further concluded that in light of the claims and the specification, a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term "baffle," as used in claim 1, to refer to its plain meaning because Phillips did not specially define the term and would not understand the term to mean only baffles orientated at an angle other than ninety degrees.
222
The district court and Phillips panel had both determined that in light of the prosecution history and prior art references cited therein, construing the term to include ninety-degree angles would invalidate the claim over the existing prior art. 223 The Federal Circuit, however, clarified that the general rule of construing claims in order to preserve their validity only applies if "the court concludes, after applying all the available tools of claim construction, that the claim is still ambiguous."
224
The court cited an 1873 case where the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of construing claims to uphold their validity to an ambiguous set of claims. 225 However, unlike that case, the Federal Circuit determined that "the claim term at issue [in Phillips was] not ambiguous" and therefore, the doctrine did not apply.
226 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit rejected the restrictive definition of the term "baffle," reversed and remanded the district court's grant of summary judgment of noninfringement, and vacated the Phillips panel decision. The Federal Circuit in Phillips purported to clarify claim construction guidelines. In reality, however, the court did not adopt any specific rules and provided no clear-cut guidance regarding how a judge should approach claim construction. As a result, the law of claim construction is perhaps less clear now than it was before the Phillips decision.
229
The Federal Circuit's adopted approach undoubtedly increases a judge's flexibility in conducting claim construction analysis. However, this increased flexibility is directly correlated to an increased unpredictability in the claim construction process from the perspective of a litigant (or anyone else attempting to interpret the claims).
One only has to look at the Phillips decision itself, in light of the panel and district court decisions, to see evidence that the claim construction analysis adopted by the Federal Circuit does not promote certainty or predictability. For example, the district court and the original panel majority, using only intrinsic evidence, determined that the meaning of the term "baffle" was limited to orientations at angles other than ninety degrees.
230
Both courts reached this conclusion after analyzing the language of the claims construed in light of the specification. Neither court relied on the Texas Digital "dictionary first" approach or extrinsic evidence in construing the meaning of the term. Thus, the claim construction principles utilized by the district court and Federal Circuit panel are the same general principles restated and expressly adopted by the en banc court in Phillips. Yet, the en banc court, after conducting the claim construction analysis de novo, found the 
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CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM 259 disputed term to have a different meaning. 231 Moreover, the Phillips dissent applied these same claim construction principles, but ultimately agreed with the district court and panel majority as to the meaning of the disputed term. 232 Whereas, the dissent in the original Phillips panel decision relied on Texas Digital and the "dictionary first" approach instead of the specification-an approach which the Federal Circuit purported to reject in Phillips-but reached the same conclusion as the en banc court as to the meaning of the term "baffle."
233 It is no wonder the patent bar is confused about the appropriate standards for claim construction.
Upon review of the district court, panel majority, and en banc opinions, one finds it difficult to distinguish the difference in the overall analyses applied by the district court, Federal Circuit panel, and en banc court. 234 Specifically, the district court, panel majority, and Federal Circuit en banc decisions each construed the claims in light of the specification and considered the various types of evidence in the same order. 235 Ultimately, however, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court and original panel decisions. Thus, there is a distinction to be made between applying the correct legal standard-which both lower court decisions did-and reaching the correct claim construction resultwhich both lower court decisions apparently did not. Under the current claim construction "guidelines," one can apply the correct legal standard, but reach the incorrect result, and apply the incorrect legal standard, but still reach the correct result. This much is evidenced by the various majority and dissenting opinions. The result in Phillips emphasizes the uncertainty of the appeals process and suggests to litigants that they cannot predict the outcome of their appeal based on whether or not the lower court applies the "right" or "wrong" claim construction principles.
Part of the problem stems from the numerous pitfalls a court may get stuck in during the process of claim construction, pitfalls that the Federal Circuit may or may not catch on appeal. It also stems from the fact that the Federal Circuit has failed to provide adequate and uniform claim 231. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328. 232. Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 233. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text (stating that the district court erroneously construed the term "baffles").
234. The one thing that does stand out among these three opinions is the Federal Circuit's determination that the disputed term "baffle" is not ambiguous. The district court had supported its construction of the disputed term, which was ultimately held to be incorrect, with Federal Circuit precedent. 236 Perhaps if the Federal Circuit had addressed, clarified, or corrected the district court's use of this precedent instead of merely stating alternative case law to support its position on appeal, distinguishing these cases would be less complicated. It would also be easier for other district courts to avoid these same pitfalls in their claim construction inquiries. However, it would also limit the Federal Circuit's flexibility to pick and choose among various precedents for support in subsequent claim construction decisions. The unpredictability in the appeals process is directly related to the Federal Circuit's desire to retain this flexibility, at the cost of certainty and uniformity, and its seeming inability to decide on a set of clear-cut guidelines. Without distinct guidelines, lower courts will be left to wander among the conflicting standards of existing precedent, interpreting it for themselves, only to be reversed on appeal to the Federal Circuit.
Resolving Claim Construction by Resort to Strictly Algorithmic Rules
It seems as though nearly everyone but the Federal Circuit can decide on a specific claim construction standard. The Federal Circuit's failure to adopt a specific rubric of rules in Phillips was definitely not due to a shortage of methodologies to choose from. 237 However, to be fair to the Federal Circuit judges, there is also no unanimous agreement among the patent bar as to the preferred analysis for claim construction. Therefore, perhaps instead of picking one of the numerous proffered methodologies, the Federal Circuit merely chose not to select one at all. However, as explained below, this decision carries with it a number of implications for the patent system that the Federal Circuit judges may not have contemplated.
The court's admission that claim construction requires case-by-case adjudication and that the particular facts of each case will determine the best manner for construing the claims underscores the argument that claim construction is, at least in part, an inherently fact-based endeavor and should be reviewed on appeal with some amount of deference. 238 Yet, the court in Phillips declined to address de novo review. Moreover, even under a deferential standard of review, case-by-case adjudication will still result in inconsistent caselaw without substantially more guidance from the Federal Circuit on the proper methodology for construing claims. Because the facts of a particular case control the claim construction inquiry, but the Federal Circuit is not bound by any of the district court's findings of fact with regard to the construed claim, the Federal Circuit must adopt a distinct set of rules for claim construction if this area of law is ever to have any uniformity or predictability-features that are essential to a strong patent system. 239 Patents must be predictably and uniformly construed "for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public." 240 Instead, the Federal Circuit in Phillips adopted what one commentator terms the "holistic approach"-one having no set methodology. 241 The bright-line "dictionary first" rule from Texas Digital supplies at least an illusion of certainty.
242 Whereas, the "holistic approach" does not even supply this illusion-it promotes neither innovation nor certainty. 243 With no set standard, inventors and patent attorneys will spend considerable time drafting patent documents in anticipation of the different judges they may encounter in the event of litigation. 244 They must attempt to draft documents in such a way that everyone imaginable clearly understands what is being claimed. They KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
will indiscriminately define every detail and nuance, which may ultimately be unnecessary or redundant, and may unduly narrow the scope of the claims thereby reducing the patent's value. This wastes the monetary resources of the inventor and, in many cases, the time of the patent attorney. More work for attorneys equals more cost for patentees and, implicitly, fewer patent applications as inventors become less inclined to waste their time and money filing for a patent that costs to more than it is worth. Fewer patent applications means a decrease in inventions, or at least a reduction in the public disclosure of these inventions, and fewer inventions eventually leads to diminishing innovation. Accordingly, while the "holistic approach" allows judges more flexibility in construing claims, it also undermines the purposes of the patent system as a whole.
On the other hand, from the perspective of the patent industry (and perhaps a more cynical view), patent attorneys want plenty of work and they want to be shielded from malpractice lawsuits when a court does not decide a case as predicted. Having no set standard means that patent applications will have to be much more carefully drafted, and after Phillips, will probably all contain a glossary of term definitions at the end of the specification. 245 This necessarily translates into more work (and more money) for patent attorneys. Further, because there is no set standard: (1) it will be impossible to always draft a "perfect" patent that avoids litigation; (2) litigation will be much less certain, so there will be more appeals which means more work for appellate lawyers; and (3) even if the attorney loses on appeal, the unpredictability of the appellate process takes the blame. Therefore, after Phillips, it may be harder for a patent attorney to counsel clients, but when it comes to the bottom line, no one benefits more than attorneys from the uncertainty of the system.
Certainty Versus Accuracy
Perhaps the Federal Circuit desires to retain flexibility in claim construction so it can ensure that disputed claim terms are ultimately construed accurately.
However, does realization of the desired uniformity and certainty in claim construction require sacrificing accuracy and precision in determining the "correct" meaning of the disputed term? If so, is it worth finding the "correct" definition of a disputed term if it means sacrificing certainty and predictability? This, of course, assumes not only that there is a right and wrong way to 245 . This, however, is already a fairly common practice among experienced patent attorneys.
construe a term, but also that certainty and accuracy are mutually exclusive goals of the claim construction process.
In light of the public notice function of a patent, the "right answer" or "correct meaning" seems to be defined as when persons of ordinary skill in the art can readily understand what the patentee meant by the terms used in the patent document when it was drafted. This, in some cases, is different from the definition that the patentee would later like to ascribe to the term (which likely leads to infringement) or the definition that the alleged infringer would like to ascribe to the term (which likely does not lead to infringement). On the other hand, courts seem to be bending over backwards to divine the ultimate meaning of disputed terms. Is this an efficient or legitimate use of judicial resources? One commentator thinks not and has argued that courts rarely, if ever, need extrinsic evidence to properly construe claim terms. 246 He further argues that "claim construction should not be an unbounded search for the disputed term's 'meaning,' but instead a rational process of selection from between the two" alternatives proffered by the parties.
247
This approach would at least narrow a litigant's chance of reversal on appeal to fifty/fifty and provide some predictability. However, this approach seems less than ideal if there is concern with the judge determining the "right definition" instead of just picking between two biased definitions, which may support a party's position, but which might not be the truly correct meaning of the term. If the Federal Circuit were to pick a distinct rubric of rules, then patentees, inventors, patent attorneys, litigators, and the courts would all be able to approach patent drafting and claim construction with a degree of conformity. 249 A clear standard for claim construction will lead to both certainty and accuracy in construing claims. There would be certainty at the outset from the perspective of a patentee because a patent will not only be drafted according to these rules, it will also be construed according to these same rules. Accordingly, patentees can more clearly draft patents with these rules in mind, knowing that patent examiners, 246 . Y'Barbo, supra note 52, at 687-88. 247. Id. at 688. 248. Of course, it may never be truly possible to determine the ultimate meaning of a word. 249. Regardless of whether they agree with those rules, everyone will at least be on the same page at the outset. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 judges, competitors, and persons of ordinary skill in the art will use these same rules in construing the patent claims and hopefully understand their intended meaning. While drafting the patent, patentees would be able to run through a clear checklist of requirements to test the patent's "definitional correctness" and clarity. Patent examiners would use a similar checklist and know the standard to which they must hold the patent in order for it to be accurately construed by the courts in the event of litigation. Everyone would know in advance which aspects were being left up to chance and which aspects were no longer open for debate. Then, the patent will necessarily have been drafted according to its "correct meaning"-the meaning intended by the patentee and readily understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art-and thus, will be construed accurately.
Even if the Federal Circuit does not adopt a specific rubric of rules, the USPTO could impose stricter patent prosecution rules requiring patentees to define nearly everything at the outset or risk having their claims rejected as ambiguous. Although this heightened standard may require patentees to narrow the scope of their invention beyond what they would prefer, it would also prevent claim construction cases from clogging up the court system with numerous appeals. 250 Moreover, it would remove the incentive for patentees to be intentionally vague when drafting claims. 251 However, considering that patent office examiners are already over worked, and already spend an insufficient amount of time with each patent, this course of action seems to be the less favorable (and least likely) of the two.
252
In either case, placing a higher burden on the patentee at the outset with a clear set of guidelines to follow, will lead to both more certainty and more accuracy in patent drafting and in claim construction.
What About Dictionaries?
The Federal Circuit spent four pages in Phillips explaining why courts should not afford dictionaries the special treatment suggested by Texas Digital. However, it then qualified its position in several subsequent paragraphs explaining the value of dictionaries to a claim construction inquiry-as if to set them apart from other extrinsic 250 However, dictionaries can serve two distinct functions in the context of claim construction that the Federal Circuit has never explicitly addressed. Perhaps it is the dual nature of dictionaries that might explain the seemingly inconsistent treatment of dictionaries by the Federal Circuit in its decisions.
There are two different circumstances under which a judge might consult a dictionary while conducting a claim construction inquiry. Under one circumstance, the term at issue may be a rather ordinary word that the judge generally understands in the context of the patent, but consults a dictionary in order to ascertain the scope of that term's meaning. 254 In that case, the dictionary provides the judge with a variety of definitions for the disputed term and tells the judge how the disputed term should be defined according to the inventor's intentions. This may be the use of dictionaries that the Federal Circuit cautioned against in its initial discussion of extrinsic evidence and the Texas Digital opinion.
Under the second circumstance, the term at issue may be an extremely technical term of art and the judge has no idea what it means during or after reading the patent. In that case, the judge consults a dictionary not because he is looking to be told what the term should mean, but rather needs to ascertain what the word means period. 255 The dictionary is a source of information serving to educate the judge on, and introduce the judge to, the relevant technical field for the judge's own initial understanding. This is perhaps what the Federal Circuit meant by the "appropriate use of dictionaries" in claim construction. 256 In which case, the Federal Circuit's statements regarding dictionaries are not entirely inconsistent, but represent a more practical approach to the two distinct functions dictionaries can serve in claim construction. 
D. Implications of De Novo Review Exemplified in Phillips
Adopting a specific rubric of rules for claim construction would promote more uniformity, certainty, and accuracy. However, it still fails to address the underlying and more significant problem of the fact/law distinction and standard of review in claim construction cases. In theory, matters of law decided by a single appellate court should result in standardized precedent with regard to a given area of law. In practice, however, the Federal Circuit's claim construction precedent has failed to achieve this desired uniformity and has, in fact, resulted in inconsistent decisions and conflicting lines of authority leading to confusion and uncertainty among lower courts and within the Federal Circuit itself.
258
De novo review after Cybor has only increased the unpredictability of the appeals process in infringement litigation.
259
For example, the Federal Circuit reverses approximately one-third of all patent cases, which includes claim construction cases, heard on appeal.
260
The high reversal rate on appeal carries with it substantial economic considerations for litigants "because there is no certainty as to the scope of [one's] claims until the Federal Circuit ultimately rules."
261 Under existing law, infringement litigation has been fraught with instability due to differing methods of claim construction applied within the Federal Circuit and, consequently, among district courts, which rely on the Federal Circuit for guidance and precedent. 262 Thus far, however, the Supreme Court's vision of intrajurisdictional certainty and uniformity in Markman II has not been realized by the courts. 258. See Burgess, supra note 10, at 782-86 (arguing that the Cybor decision characterizing claim construction as a matter of law has resulted in inconsistent decisions and confusion in the district courts). Compare, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating claim construction entails looking to the words of the claims themselves, reviewing the specification, considering the prosecution history of the patent, and if necessary, considering extrinsic evidence), with Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1201-05 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that the analytical focus must begin and remain on discerning the ordinary meaning of the claim terms through dictionaries or otherwise before resorting to the specification for certain limited purposes). The Federal Circuit was created as a solution to the inconsistent treatment of patents among the various federal circuit courts, which underscores the irony of the current intracircuit inconsistencies.
259. See Chu, supra note 5, at 1097-98 (stating that a litigant has virtually as much of a chance of having a patent case reversed as affirmed Although the Federal Circuit posed the question of standard of review to the parties for consideration on appeal, it refrained from deciding the issue in its en banc opinion. 265 The Federal Circuit's failure to address the standard of review question demonstrates an inability to convincingly rebut the nearly twenty amicus curiae briefs that advocated some type of deference to the district court's claim construction determinations. 266 If findings of fact were reviewed for clear error, claim construction would be consistent with other areas of patent law, such as obviousness, where different standards of review are applied to the fact and law components of mixed fact and law questions. 267 However, because claim construction is subject to absolute de novo review, the Federal Circuit remains free to conduct its own claim construction analysis regardless of whether a lower court applies the claim construction principles advocated in Phillips. Considering the ever increasing amount of control asserted over patent law by the Federal Circuit since the court's creation, it could at least defer to the district court's findings of fact regarding a term's meaning. 268 This would provide more certainty and/or predictability for litigants and reduce the high reversal rate on appeal.
However, perhaps Federal Circuit Judge Rader was right, and patents are simply not amenable to any clear-cut rules. 269 It may just be the (recognizing the importance of uniformity in the treatment of patents as an independent reason to allocate all construction issues to judges); see also supra notes 239-40 (citing language from Markman II).
264. This could be due in part to the fact that patent law cases are easier to distinguish from each other than other types of cases, because the underlying patents have to be inherently distinguishable. 267. Hagberg & Pernick, supra note 4, at 4. 268. See Sung, supra note 10, at 1250 (discussing the increasing authority over patent law the Federal Circuit keeps granting to itself). At first glance, it seems like deference to district courts in different circuits would lead to more uncertainty and less uniformity at the start of litigation because some judges are decidedly less "pro patent." Moore, supra note 41, at 240-41. However, once the Federal Circuit adopts a distinct set of claim construction guidelines, district courts will no longer be free to fashion their own standards for interpreting patents and patent litigants will know right away whether the district court applied the correct rules to their patents. Therefore, they will also know their chances of a favorable ruling on appeal.
269. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing whether it is better to approach KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 nature of patent claim construction that requires case-by-case adjudication and de novo review. And perhaps the problem is not as bad as it seems considering the small number of patents actually litigated compared to the number of patents granted each year. 270 These unusual cases that get litigated might be bad proxies for determining the overall state of patent claim construction. Moreover, care should be taken when changing the rules so that in trying to fix the small number of cases that make it to litigation, the remainder of the patent system is not injured when it may be working just fine.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are clear inconsistencies within the Federal Circuit under the existing law. In Phillips, the court should have done more than simply reaffirm existing claim construction principles. As the forgoing discussion indicates, the Federal Circuit must adopt a specific and detailed rubric of rules for claim construction regarding not only the importance of each type of evidence, but also the order in which the judge should apply each category of evidence to the disputed terms. The Federal Circuit judges must agree to apply these adopted rules consistently and with uniformity in their own panel decisions. They should address their differences on the fact/law divergence and standard of review separately from the construction of the disputed claim terms. 271 Unless, and until, there is certainty from the outset, there will rarely be accuracy in the end. 271. This may be wishful thinking considering the Federal Circuit judges seem more interested in being "right" with regard to standard of review and issues of fact/matters of law, than following precedent.
